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Discussion
BREXIT IS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS UNDER
GLOBALISATION
Q1Valentina Kostadinova*
2016 may well go down in history as a year when political and economic tides turned. The election of
Donald Trump as theUnited States (US) President is themost prominent event to suggest this.Many
see this as the culmination – so far – of a backlash against the forces and values underpinning the
processes of globalisation, bringing to prominence protectionist responses. For many, though, the
harbinger of change was the outcome of the 23 June referendum on the United Kingdom’s (UK)
membership of the European Union (EU).
Among the plethora of analyses of this decision and its possible repercussions are the recent
contributions by Schwartz (2016) and Bourne (2016) in this journal. The current article continues this
debate, arguing that the popular vote for theUK to leave the EU (‘Brexit’) highlights many questions
about how we are governed today.
I see Brexit as a protest vote in which many British citizens who felt disenfranchised re-engaged
with the political process. It clearly demonstrates that current UK political structures have failed to
deliver on the expectations of many, in the process creating deep societal polarisation. But the fall-out
from Brexit can provide an opportunity for readjusting British and EU1 governing structures so that
they better meet the expectations of their respective populations. To capitalise on this opportunity,
however, it is necessary ﬁrst to understand the key grievances that led to the Brexit vote. Second, the
measures undertaken in response will have to address present dissatisfactions – but crucially without
wiping out the gains from globalisation processes, most notably increased overall wealth. In other
words, the challenge today is to readjust our governing arrangements in ways that allow for the more
equitable distribution of the fruits of globalisation. If the response to the Brexit vote now fails to
strike this balance it will be unsustainable; it will not manage to live up to the test of our times. The
likely repercussion from this would be further, and more serious, political and economic turmoil.
The following two sections elaborate on these points in turn. The key contention is that the ideas
presently on offer for addressing the grievances highlighted by the referendum are unlikely to strike a
good balance in distributing the outcomes of globalisation. This conclusion rests on consideration of
the thrust of the solutions offered by the Leave campaign and more recently by the 2016
Conservative Party conference. This doubtful ability of Brexit to deliver opens up avenues for
exploring governing arrangements that are potentially more sustainable in the long term. The ﬁnal
section outlines some brief thoughts on this, sketching out ways for tackling the key obstacles to
establishing reformed governing arrangements better adjusted to a globalised environment.
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What informed the Brexit vote?
The vote to leave the EU was not based on a single issue. Attempts to identify the grievances that
affected the outcome of the referendum must take into account a diverse and at times cross-cutting
range of issues. Menon and Salter (2016, p. 1314) sum them up well along two main axes: economic
andmaterial circumstances and attitudinal positioning. An elaboration on these variables facilitates a
better understanding of the speciﬁc needs and expectations of the British people which governing
structures should aim to address, but are not doing so satisfactorily at present.
With regard to economic and material circumstances, the evidence on the vote shows that on
average Leave supporters were less well-off than Remain voters in terms of education, income, or
career avenues (for more details see Lord Ashcroft Polls 2016, pp. 2–3). Furthermore, material and
economic conditions led to clear geographic divisions in the voting outcome (BBC 2016), with some
indication that the Leave vote was systematically higher in regions affected more strongly by the
surge in Chinese imports over the last 30 years (Colantone and Stanig 2016). Thus, social and
economic concerns over access to opportunities and wealth distribution seem likely to have been key
to affecting the vote to leave. This indicates a failure, in both the UK and the wider EU, to alter the
relevant governing structures so that they ensure preservation or even improvement in the standard
of living of individuals and some regions through well-paid jobs and good-quality affordable services.
Attitudinal positioning is encapsulated by the distinction between those who dislike difference
and those who embrace it. Kaufmann (2016, pp. 3–4) refers to this as the order–openness divide.
Broadly speaking, the more one leans towards the order end of the spectrum, the more one values
issues like belonging, certainty, roots, and safety. In contrast, those more inclined towards openness
prioritise issues like excessive individualism or cultural equality. Conﬁrming this argument, the data
show that voters who thought that phenomena such asmulticulturalism or globalisation are forces for
ill supported by large majorities leaving the EU. They see more threats than opportunities from the
way the society and the economy are changing (Lord Ashcroft Polls 2016, pp. 10–11).
This is a plausible explanation for the salience of sovereignty in the Brexit debate. The idea that
the ultimate decision-making power should remain with the British government, whether in the ﬁeld
of legislation or on the issue of borders, was the key concern of Leave supporters (Lord Ashcroft
Polls 2016, p. 6). This is the result of the belief, ultimately going back to shared feeling of national
identity, that British decision-makers will better protect and promote the interests of British voters.2
Such grievances relate, at least partly, to the EU’s democratic deﬁcit. This term denotes the EU’s
problems in making its decision-making and policy processes transparent to the public and its
perceived lack of accountability and responsiveness to the demands of EU citizens. Such issues
indicate a failure of the European integration project to develop governing structures that meet the
expectations of citizens when it comes to the relationship between authority, accountability, and
legitimacy.
Regardless of the speciﬁc reasons that informed the vote to leave the EU in each particular case,
the ofﬁcial Leave campaign spoke tomany of the above grievances, suggesting that it had the answer.
For those who voted to leave out of a desire to preserve sovereignty because they were closer to the
order end of the order–openness axis, this campaign promised more control. For those motivated
primarily by economic concerns, the Leave campaign contained pledges, or suggestions of pledges,
for greater spending on the National Health Service, schools, or housing.3 Furthermore, the premise
of these solutions was re-articulated as the way forward by the Conservative Party during its 2016
annual conference. Arguably, however, as the next section explains in more detail, these responses
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are unlikely to address today’s pressing challenge of enabling continuation of the beneﬁts of
globalisation while ensuring their more equitable spread.
Why are the solutions suggested by the Leave campaign unsustainable?
Scepticism about Brexit’s ability to address present challenges rests on two key points. First, it
arises out of the following conundrum: while it provides a pathway to alleviating the attitudinal
grievances discussed above, there is a danger that this will come at the expense of closing global
ﬂows down. Such a closure would likely halt the positive outcomes of globalisation processes as
these rely on openness. This not only would threaten future increases in cumulative wealth but
would also likely be accompanied by economic and political turmoil as it will aggravate current
grievances about access to opportunities and the distribution of wealth. This expectation rests on
data suggesting that most individuals are not willing to sacriﬁce the positives of globalisation. For
example, according to a poll conducted on 14 June 2016, while 61 per cent of respondents said
they would be willing to accept a short-term economic slowdown in order to tighten controls on
immigration, 68 per cent indicated that they would not be happy if this hit their own pockets
(ComRes 2016). The Chancellor of the Exchequer’s statement that on 23 June the British people
did not vote to become poorer (Hammond 2016) shows that politicians are aware of this dilemma.
The difﬁcult balancing act the British government will have to achieve in the forthcoming Brexit
negotiations on the free movement of people/Single Market access nexus4 encapsulates this
conundrum.
Furthermore, the present terms of the Brexit debate in the UK gives the impression that
individual actors can steer globalisation processes in their preferred direction. Undoubtedly this is
true to some extent. The potential effect American protectionism can have on global economic
relations clearly demonstrates this. Nevertheless, I would suggest that this underestimates the role of
structural factors. From this viewpoint, there is only somuch impact that actors can have on unfolding
structural processes. In other words, even if the outcome of the 23 June referendum shows the clear
view of an actor (the British electorate), there are limits to its ability to implement its preferences in
practice. Arguably, the best one can hope for in the aftermath of the referendum is the emergence of
a narrative that aims to tackle the grievances expressed but crucially also recognises the changing
context in which this takes place. At present I remain unconvinced that the solutions proposed by
Brexiteers fully account for, or respond to, the deep structural changes that international affairs have
undergone as a result of globalisation processes. This is my second reason for being sceptical about
Brexit. More speciﬁcally, as elaborated on below, globalisation has fundamentally changed the form
and context of state power. In turn, this leads to challenges to the traditional organisation of politics
along national lines. Despite such changes implying a move away from traditional governing
arrangements, the current debate seems stuck in advancing solutions based on Westphalian
principles,5 which are premised on state sovereignty.
Although states continue to be sovereign, they face increasing challenges to their ability to
successfully perform their key functions, whether as providers of security or of wealth for their
citizens, by acting on their own. This is what William Wallace means when he makes a distinction
between sovereignty and autonomy. As he explains, sovereignty is the ultimate primacy of the power
of the state, while autonomy is a relative (not an absolute) concept assessed with reference to
external constraints and domestic vulnerabilities to outside developments (1994, p. 53). For many, at
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present a state’s inability to attain certain goals is a symptom of loss not of sovereignty but of
autonomy. An Illustration of this development is Trump’s campaign slogan ‘Make America Great
Again’. Although no one doubts that the US remains a sovereign state, the slogan expresses a
grievance overAmerica’s limited ability to successfully attain its policy goals in practice. This is partly
the result of it becoming more vulnerable to external developments. This increasing strain between
sovereignty and autonomy is a result of the surge in complex interdependencies which have
accompanied the present phase of globalisation (for more details, see Held and McGrew 2002, p. 2).
Thus, a crucial structural change that is taking place at present and that is altering the form and
context of state power is the limitation that interdependence imposes on the ability of state
policymakers to attain the desired outcomes from the policies they enact.
This pushes the state to search for novel ways of preserving its stance and performing its key
functions. Over time, interaction and cooperation with other states have emerged as a promising way
of attaining these goals. The EU is one particular form of it. Its supranational elements have the
beneﬁt of addressing a crucial obstacle to achieving agreed-upon mutually beneﬁcial goals, namely
the fear that one or more parties might renege on the provisions they have agreed to. Of course,
international cooperation takes other forms as well, which at least nominally allow the preservation
of national sovereignty. NATO is often cited as an example of such cooperation. The proponents of
this view, however, seem to overlook the point that in practice NATO’s mutual defence clause
potentially poses even more severe danger to national sovereignty as it involves committing national
military forces to action, the ultimate decision a sovereign state canmake. Thus, the second structural
change we are witnessing today is that, despite its different forms, under current conditions of
interdependence states ﬁnd it necessary to cooperate at unprecedented levels in an effort to achieve
their preferred outcomes.
This, however, challenges the traditional organisation of politics, which since the emergence
of the Westphalian system in the seventeenth century has been conducted within the boundaries
of national states. The other key feature of politics in Western democracies has been that
authority and power are linked to accountability, loyalty, and legitimacy through the electoral
process (Wallace 1994, p. 75). Today the electoral process is increasingly unable to hold to
account those responsible for a particular decision, as in many cases these people are not
national politicians but are increasingly likely to be foreign businesspeople or decision-makers. In
turn this undermines the legitimacy of developments in a country, ultimately leading to
backlashes against the authority and power exercised by national politicians, precisely what
happened with the Brexit vote.
The shock of the referendum outcome has rightly focused attention on these matters of grave
importance. The level of dissatisfaction and polarisation the vote reveals signiﬁes an urgent need to
attend to the underlying grievances. The problem, however, is the failure of the solutions proposed in
the present debate to indicate a credible way forward. As discussed above, at present we are left
hoping that a balance will be found between the contradictory pressures exercised by globalisation,
but this is unlikely because we are yet to come to terms with the structural challenges that the
traditional organisation of politics and the exercise of state power face. Only after we have done so
will we be in a position to establish governing institutions that enable a more equitable distribution of
the fruits of globalisation.
The next section offers brief thoughts on the key principles that should guide reforms of
governance arrangements, the key obstacles to attaining them, and ways of overcoming these
obstacles.
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Reformed governance arrangements: key principles, obstacles, and remedies
The overall thrust of future governance arrangements should be towards achieving two key
interrelated outcomes. First, they should aim to restore the links of authority and power to
accountability, loyalty, and legitimacy. Second, they should enable wealth distribution that diverse
and signiﬁcant sections of the population perceive as equitable. Some blueprints for the new
governance arrangements in the EU have already been discussed in the literature. This debate is
wide-ranging, embracing both those who advocate scaling back EU institutions (e.g. Vaubel 2016)
and those who broadly speaking think the EU should expand them further (Schmidt 2009).
Ultimately, the actual form of the new governance institutions will be determined by the struggles
between the proponents of these different views. Therefore, at present it is difﬁcult to foresee the
particular way in which events will unfold.
Nevertheless, I think that if the arrangements are to be able to live up to the principles outlined
above, they will have to be innovative, adjusting the new settlement to the changed environment. In
that endeavour we will keep coming up against familiar problems, namely the attachment to
traditional solutions and world views, Westphalian understandings of the state as sovereign,
expectations that national politics or elections can resolve the problems of the day, and loyalty to the
nation. I see these understandings as the key obstacles to framing a successful response to today’s
challenges. I think that the best way to overcome them is to increase awareness of the historical
contingency of these phenomena.6 Such an approach will underscore the fact that over time the
governing arrangements in different kinds of political communities have evolved while loyalties have
shifted. Hopefully this realisation will facilitate greater openness to the impending shifts.
Furthermore, seeing present governing arrangements and political practices from a historical
perspective will highlight the crucial role the state has played in establishing the nation as a political
and social community (for more details see Ferrera 2005a, esp. chs 2–3; Ferrera 2005b; Mau 2005;
Bartolini 2005, ch. 2). This reveals the enormous power states still exercise in moulding our thinking
about the world, including how we are governed. As argued here, however, maintaining the
perspectives states impress upon us is increasingly unlikely to provide us with the means of utilising
the opportunities on offer in today’s world. Therefore, the sooner we stop taking the state or national
identiﬁcation for granted, the sooner we will be in a position to think creatively about how we can
perform the governing functions needed for a thriving political community in ways compatible with
our present environment.
Notes
1. This is the case because of growing discontent, not only in the UK but also in other member states, with the way the EU
works.
2. Crucially, such expectations disregard shortcomings in the British political system, which ultimately also lead to deﬁciencies
in the ways British decision-makers protect and promote the interests of British voters.
3. For a brief overview of the overall message of the Leave campaign, seeWhyVote Leave at http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.
org/why_vote_leave.html (accessed 1 October 2016).
4. The freemovement of people/Single Market nexus refers to the trade-off between protecting British economic interests that
require the ability to trade with the EU’s Single Market and the perceived need to restrict free movement of EU nationals
due to the referendum result. Given that the EU’s position at present is that the freedoms of the Single Market are not
separable, these two goals seem contradictory. The particular way in which the contradiction is resolved will be the focal
point of Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK.
5. For a succinct overview of the Westphalian governing arrangements and their current challenges, see Taylor (1994).
6. There is rich literature that engages with these issues in detail: Walker (1995), Krasner (1993), Anderson (2006) or Philpott
(1999).
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